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Abstract
After a brief overview of different company valuation theories, this paper presents the main
functions (decision, arbitration, and argument or negotiation function) of company valuation
according to the functional (i.e., purpose-oriented) theory. The main body of the paper focuses on
the decision function and shows how the decision value can be derived as a subjective limit value
that different economic agents assign to the company. Finally, the differences between the
functional and the market value oriented theory of company valuation are discussed.
KEYWORDS: decision function, decision value, functional business valuation, subjective limit
value
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INTRODUCTION 
In this article, we introduce the reader to the concept of functional business 
valuation, a business valuation concept which stresses the importance of taking 
into account for whom the valuation is conducted and for which purpose. We 
discuss the valuation of a business as a whole entity or bigger self-contained parts 
thereof to which economic results can be assigned, in particular payments. These 
economic results can be influenced by owner or manager activities and are thus 
person- and plan-dependent. We do not discuss the valuation of single non-
influential, not self-contained goods and of the goodwill in connection with 
accounting. 
The functional business valuation concept can be applied to the purchase 
and sale of a business as well as to merger and split situations. In these situations, 
conflicts between different parties, such as between the buyer and the seller or 
between the partners in a merger or split, are prevalent in the sense that everybody 
seeks to seize a maximum share of the transaction gain. At the same time, also 
common interests are present with regard to finding a transaction that is 
acceptable to all parties involved. Application possibilities for functional business 
valuation are abound. According to the German Chamber of Commerce (IHK), in 
April 2008 there existed 1,845,474 registered businesses, of which only 17,450 
were stock companies, of which only 1,178 were publicly traded at a German 
stock exchange (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2009, p 66). 
This means that for most sale/purchase or merger/split transactions, it is 
not possible to employ “market prices” for valuation purposes because such prices 
simply do not exist. But even if market prices for firm shares (for publicly traded 
companies) exist, the knowledge of such a market price is not sufficient in order 
to decide whether a transaction is beneficial for all parties involved. To determine 
whether the transaction is sensible for a party, this party has to know its decision 
value, the limit value to which the suggested transaction price can be accepted. 
For example, at the stock exchange, buyers and sellers typically set limit prices 
which can be interpreted as decision values: If the actual market price falls below 
a buyer’s limit price, the buyer will buy, if it rises above a seller’s limit price, the 
seller will sell. A transaction between a buyer and a seller takes place if the actual 
market price lies between the respective limit prices. Using the market price as 
decision value is even more out of place when bigger share parcels are traded. In 
this case, a negotiation solution is the typical outcome. During these negotiations, 
the “price” per share is not necessarily the sole or most important object of 
negotiations. In functional business valuation, this is reflected in allowing for a 
multi-dimensional decision value – as opposed to just a one-dimensional decision 
value (limit price), reflecting the fact that a typical agreement contains much more 
information than just a price. A multidimensional decision value would indeed be 
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a very complex “market price” since it does not only include a price, but also 
other, oftentimes non-monetary components. Such a complex contract does not 
form at the stock exchange, but is the outcome of negotiations or – in special 
cases – arbitration. Summarizing, the functional business valuation concept lays 
the theoretical foundation for understanding conflict-related agreement processes 
in imperfect and incomplete markets by defining the relevant conflict situation 
and discussing the adequate determination of decision, arbitration, and 
argumentation values with stress on the determination of the decision value.  
The global economic crisis has ruthlessly exposed the shortcomings of 
the currently applied methods of business valuation. After all, these methods 
mostly rely on concepts of capital market theory that are based on the assumption 
of a perfect market and perfect competition in an idealized model world. In many 
cases, reasonable economic decisions, e.g., concerning the acquisition or sale of a 
business, cannot be based on these models. Such decisions rather require models 
that explicitly consider the existence of imperfect markets as well as the precise 
goals, plans, and expectations of the person for whom the valuation is to be 
conducted. 
The literature on business valuation is often confined to enumerating 
different values and consequently focuses on the question which of the numerous 
business values might be the “right” one. Functional business valuation denies the 
existence of an objective or “right” business value. The basis of a client-oriented 
valuation must be the ideas of the client for what reason he wants a value to be 
calculated. Business valuation is seen as an economic process to make all partners 
of the deal content, i.e., a way of most effectively investing scarce capital. 
Such a subject-oriented concept of functional business valuation has been 
available in Germany for over thirty years. This paper provides an introduction to 
this valuation concept for an English-speaking audience. After an overview of the 
functional concept and the main functions of business valuation in the second 
section (“Overview”), the decision function and the associated decision value are 
described in the third section (“Decision Value”). The fourth section (“Distin-
guishing between Functional and Market Value-Oriented Business Valuation”) 
demonstrates the advantages of functional business valuation compared to market-
oriented business valuation, followed by the conclusion. 
OVERVIEW 
1. DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGY 
Clear and unambiguous definitions are the foundation of every science. For this 
reason, we start by defining the core terms “valuation”, “valuation subject”, 
“valuation object”, and “value”. 
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Valuation means the allocation of a value to an object – the valuation 
object – by the respective valuation subject, in most cases in form of a monetary 
value (Sieben/Löcherbach/Matschke, 1974, p 840). Valuation subject is the 
person for whom the valuation is conducted. Since the main functions of business 
valuation concentrate on interpersonal conflicts, the opposing negotiation parties 
representing the valuation subjects are called “conflicting parties”. 
The object of valuation, in this paper mostly referred to as a  “business” or 
“company”, is the valuation object. Prototypes are the “company as a whole”, but 
also “definable parts of the company”. The term definable parts of the company is 
used to describe complex divisions of a company (e.g., individual facilities, 
divisions, or member operations), less frequently also “shares in a company”, e.g., 
in form of a block of shares or shares of a limited liability company that can be 
characterized as similar to an entire business (Schmalenbach, 1937, p 24). The term 
“definable” thus is not limited to the spatial delimitation of part of a business, but 
also applies in the sense of delimitating an abstract share in an entire business. 
The term “as a whole” means that the valuation object constitutes a 
unique conglomerate of tangible and intangible assets (production factors). The 
value of this conglomerate of assets stems from the utility provision for the 
valuation subject. It arises from the best possible efficient combination of these 
production factors. Successful entrepreneurial action causes the whole to be more 
valuable than the sum of its parts, resulting in value-increasing effects (positive 
effects of synergy, economies of scope, goodwill). These advantages of a 
combination are lost if the whole is split into its individual parts.  
To recognize positive or negative effects of combination, a company 
valuation must be preceded by a comprehensive company analysis (“Due 
Diligence”). This company analysis serves to discover value increasing potential 
based on the view of the respective valuation subject. Its goal is to assess the 
advantages and disadvantages as well as opportunities and risks with regard to the 
strategic planning of the respective valuation subject. Consequently, the valuation 
of a business needs to be embedded into the planning of the valuation subject. The 
value of a business is subjective as it depends on planning and therefore on the 
future. 
Subjectivity of a value1 is a proven economic finding. The value of an 
asset depends on a target and preference system and on the decision field of the 
                                                      
1 For the origins of the subjective value theory, see Gossen (1854), who is considered a forerunner 
of the “Wiener Grenznutzenschule”, and Menger (1871), a representative of the “Wiener Schule”. 
Nearly at the same time but independently, inter alia Jevons (representative of the British school of 
thinking) as well as Walras (representative of the Lausanne School) established the marginal 
utility theory. In contrast to the German-language school of thinking, the Neoclassical school is 
based on market equilibrium (Jevons, 1871; Walras, 1874; Schneider, 2001, p 349). Schneider 
(2001, p 674) sees characteristics of the subjective value theory even in the works of the British 
Barbon and Locke (17th century). Whereas Barbon emphasizes the relation between persons and 
3
Matschke et al.: Fundamentals of Functional Business Valuation
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
Angemeldet | 10.248.254.158
Heruntergeladen am | 28.08.14 04:47
valuation subject derived from its individual marginal utility. So the economic 
term “value” is understood as a subject-object-object relationship (Matschke, 
1972, p 147), i.e., the value represents the utility which the valuation subject 
(during a certain period and at a certain location) expects from the valuation 
object with regard to other available comparable objects. This means that the 
valuation object has a concrete value only relative to a valuation subject. There-
fore it cannot have a “value per se”, but only a value for somebody. 
2. CONCEPTS OF FUNCTIONAL BUSINESS VALUATION 
This section outlines the concepts of business valuation based on its historical 
development from the objective via the subjective to the functional business 
valuation. 
Although the concrete objectives of the objective business valuation are 
neither described in a uniform nor an unambiguous manner, the representatives of 
this concept agree on the idea of determining the value of a business 
independently of a concrete related person or a person interested in the valuation 
and on the basis of factors that could be realized by everybody.2 A very important 
aspect of objective business valuation is the idea of overcoming a conflict of 
interest between persons interested in the valuation through the independence of 
the appraiser. Thus, the objective of the independent appraiser is at the centre of 
this concept. 
The subjective business valuation was developed in contrast to the 
objective business valuation concept. It tries to assess the value of a business 
taking into account subjective planning and ideas of a concrete person interested 
in the valuation due to a certain decision situation. The business does not have one 
value as in the objective concept, but a specific and basically different value for 
every person interested in the valuation: business values are subjective. 
The functional concept integrates the subjective and the objective 
concept by emphasizing the valuation purpose. The central aspect of the
functional business valuation theory3 is the dependence on the purpose of the 
business valuation. The functional business valuation emphasizes the necessity to 
                                                                                                                                                   
things regarding the value in use, Locke deduces supply and demand from the personal evaluation 
of a product. 
2 For proponents of the objective business valuation theory, see Münstermann (1966, p 20) and 
Matschke (1979, p 20). 
3 Important publications on functional business valuation theory are inter alia Matschke (1969; 
1971; 1972; 1975; 1976; 1979), Sieben (1976), Goetzke/Sieben (1977). Further, see Tillmann 
(1998), Hering (1999), Olbrich (1999), Hering/Olbrich/Steinrücke (2006), Klingelhöfer (2006), 
Matschke/Brösel (2007) and Olbrich/Brösel/Haßlinger (2009). 
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analyze the objectives4 and the dependence of the business value on the respective 
objective. A company does not only have a specific value for each person 
interested in the valuation but may have different values depending on the 
objective. The valuation is conducted depending on its purpose; the one business 
value and the one procedure to determine it do not exist. The central issue of 
functional business valuation is therefore the purpose of a business valuation: 
Each calculation has a definite purpose and must be designed in accordance with 
this purpose. The question of the appropriate method to determine the value can 
only be answered in conformity with the given objective. 
3. (MAIN) FUNCTIONS OF BUSINESS 
VALUATION AND ITS VALUE TYPES 
Functional business valuation distinguishes between main and minor functions. 
Each function has a value type associated with it and is based on the concrete 
objective of the business valuation. The interpersonal conflicts regarding the 
conditions for a change of ownership of the business are the central criterion for 
the main functions (Brösel, 2006). The main functions refer to those valuations 
targeting a change of ownership of the business under valuation.5 Events that lead 
to a “change of ownership” include not only events where the “owner changes” 
(e.g., acquisition, sale), but also events in which the shareholders remain 
unchanged, but their share of ownership changes as a result of the conflict (e.g., 
merger, split). 
The three main functions are the decision function, the mediation 
function,6 and the argumentation function: 
1. The result of a business valuation according to the decision function is called 
the decision value of the company (Matschke, 1969, p 58). The term 
“decision function” focuses on the purpose of the business value calculation 
and provides a basis for rational decisions for a specific decision subject in a 
very specific decision and conflict situation and with regard to this project. It 
generally presents the limit of the concession willingness of a party in a 
specific conflict situation. It refers to all conditions relevant for conflict 
resolution between the parties (so-called conflict-resolution-relevant issues) 
                                                     
4 In the context of the functional business valuation theory as well as in this paper, the terms 
“function”, “purpose”, and “objective” are used as synonyms. 
5 The change in the ownership of the business to be valued and consequently the focus on 
interpersonal conflicts are regarded as the link between the three main functions; see Matschke 
(1979, p 17), Gorny (2002, p 155). 
6 This function is also referred to as negotiation or arbitration function. Following the works by 
Matschke (1971; 1979), the value determined with respect to this function is referred to as 
arbitration, mediation, or negotiation value.  
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and states the extreme cases that may still be acceptable in case of an 
agreement. The decision value is the basic value for all main functions.  
2. The arbitration value on the other hand is the result of the business valuation 
within the scope of the mediation function (Matschke, 1971; Matschke, 1979) 
and it is meant to facilitate or affect an agreement between the conflicting 
parties regarding the conditions for the ownership change of the business under 
valuation. It is the value which an independent appraiser, acting as a mediator, 
considers as a possible basis for a resolution of the conflict. The arbitration 
value constitutes a compromise, which is reasonable because it does not violate 
the decision values of the participating conflicting parties and adequately 
protects their interests.  
3. The argumentation value finally is the result of a business valuation 
according to the argumentation function (Matschke, 1976). It is an 
instrument meant to influence the beliefs of the other negotiating party in 
order to achieve a conflict resolution advantageous for the arguing party. The 
argumentation value is a prejudiced value and cannot be reasonably 
determined without knowledge of one's own decision value and assumptions 
about the opponent party’s decision value. Only the relevant decision values 
allow a party to decide what negotiation results are compatible with a rational 
action and should be targeted with a reasonable argumentation value. While 
the mediation function focuses on all conflicting parties, the decision 
function and argumentation function concentrate on one conflicting party. In 
this context, the results of the decision function constitute confidential self-
information (inside orientation during the negotiation process), and the 
results of the argumentation function constitute information directed towards 
the opponent party (outside orientation during the negotiation process).  
4. SYSTEMATIZATION OF BUSINESS VALUATION 
EVENTS ACCORDING TO THE MAIN FUNCTIONS 
A model-theoretical analysis of business valuation problems strictly in line with 
the respective valuation purpose must be based on a precisely defined initial 
situation so that the adequacy of the proposed approach can be examined 
intersubjectively. The calculation purpose can only be sensibly determined with 
respect to the calculation cause and the calculation result must in turn be assessed 
in context of the calculation purpose and the calculation cause. A business 
valuation calculation, like any other value calculation, must be purpose-oriented 
and is therefore not generally valid. The main functions cover interpersonal 
conflict situations, i.e., disputes about the terms under which a change of 
ownership of a company may or shall occur. 
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The functional business valuation is thus no equilibrium theory, but a 
theory which takes the real world as it is: imperfect! The observed events are 
consequently decision dependent and interpersonally conflicting.  
To systematize the events which may trigger a business valuation, 
Matschke proposed the following order grid (Matschke, 1975, p 30; Matschke, 
1979, p 30; Mandl/Rabel, 1997, p 14), which helps separate similar from 
distinguishable cases and thus serves to support the model-theoretical analysis and 
the derivation of adequate valuation models. The events can be classified into the 
following categories:  
1. with regard to the type of property change in conflict situations of the type 
acquisition/sale and the type merger/split, 
2. with regard to the degree of relationship in joint (affiliated) and disjoint 
(unaffiliated) conflict situations,  
3. with regard to the degree of complexity in one- and multi-dimensional 
conflict situations and 
4. with regard to the degree of dominance in dominated and non-dominated 
conflict situations.  
A broad theoretical foundation for objective- and situation-specific 
business valuation models results because the aforementioned types can and 
should be applied in combination. Thus, every valuation event can be analyzed 
within the scope of the main functions.  
The distinction of conflict situations of the type acquisition/sale and 
merger/split on the one side and dominated and non-dominated conflict situations 
on the other side are especially important.  
In a conflict situation of the type acquisition/sale, the ownership of the 
company to be valued changes when the conflicting party (seller) surrenders its 
ownership of the company in favor of the other conflicting party (buyer) and 
receives a recompensation (price in the broader sense) from the buyer in 
exchange. The central issue in these types of transactions is usually the amount of 
monetary recompensation (cash price) provided by the buyer.  
In a conflict situation of the merger type, several companies under 
valuation are combined and the ownership relations change when the owners of 
the merging companies receive direct or indirect ownership of the new economic 
entity resulting from the merger. In a conflict situation of the merger type, the 
distribution of the influence rights (ownership shares) and the distribution of 
future financial performance of the new company are the main topics of 
negotiation. In a conflict situation of the split type, the former owners split a 
company into new independent companies. 
7
Matschke et al.: Fundamentals of Functional Business Valuation
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
Angemeldet | 10.248.254.158
Heruntergeladen am | 28.08.14 04:47
change of ownership can be accomplished by one party, i.e., whether this change 
of ownership is dominated by one party, or not. A non-dominated conflict 
situation (Matschke, 1979, p 31; Matschke, 1981, p 117) exists if no single 
participating conflicting party can on its own implement a change of ownership of 
the company. In a non-dominated conflict situation, a change of ownership occurs 
only if the proposed settlement is acceptable to all parties. It requires finding a 
solution that is advantageous to all parties. In the case of a dominated conflict 
situation (Matschke, 1979, p 33), one of the participating conflicting parties may 
have the power to enforce a change of ownership of the company against the 
declared will of the other parties. Such unilaterally enforced changes of 
ownership (e.g., the forcible exclusion of minority shareholders) are restricted by 
legal regulations. Also, the dominated party can take legal action and request a 
court decision on the conditions of ownership change.  
Most of the time, it is implicitly assumed that the decision subject 
evaluates a company during a conflict situation that has no relationship to other 
conflict situations of the type acquisition/sale or merger/split. Such conflict 
situations are described as disjoint or unaffiliated conflict situations. However, an 
isolated company valuation related solely to one conflict situation is not adequate 
for the problem if the conflicting parties want to buy/sell and/or merge/split 
several companies, because it ignores the interdependencies between the conflict 
situations. In such joint or affiliated conflict situations, the decision value of the 
company in a certain conflict situation can only be properly determined with 
reference to possible agreements in other conflict situations. In this case, the 
decision value is a conditional variable.  
Acquisitions and sales as well as mergers or splits of companies are very 
complex conflict situations. With regard to the number of agreement terms 
relevant for this situation, theory distinguishes between one-dimensional and 
multi-dimensional conflict situations. In reality, an agreement between the parties 
depends on many factors,7 of which the (cash) price for the company in case of 
acquisitions and sales as well as the division of ownership shares of a company 
after a merger or of the companies after a split are important, but not the only 
conditions relevant for an agreement between the parties. All these conditions are 
called conflict-resolution-relevant issues. This means that it makes sense to 
describe company valuation situations as multi-dimensional conflict situations. In 
contrast, a one-dimensional conflict situation of the type acquisition/sale is 
usually assumed implicitly.                                                       
7 Other conflict-resolution-relevant issues are, for instance, asset deal or share deal, the definition 
of the company which is to be acquired/sold, or the composition of the business management due 
to mergers. 
The distinction between dominated and non-dominated conflict situations
describes the balance of power between the conflicting parties with regard to the 
change of ownership of the company under valuation. The issue is whether such 
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DECISION VALUE 
1. DECISION VALUE AS SINGLE- 
AND MULTI-DIMENSIONAL VARIABLE 
The decision value, being the basis and an indispensable element of the mediation 
function as well as the argumentation function, shall now be discussed in detail. 
The decision value of the company is the result of a business valuation 
within the scope of the decision function (Matschke, 1975; Hering, 2006; 
Matschke/Brösel, 2007). The term does not focus on the valuation procedure but 
on the purpose of the company valuation calculation. 
Given the target system and the decision field of the decision subject, the 
decision value shows under which circumstances or which set of conditions a 
certain action can lead to the same level of target achievement (utility value, 
success) that would have also been attained in this situation without this action. 
The utility values themselves cannot be subject of the negotiation and agreement 
process between the parties, but only the conflict-resolution-relevant issues, which 
change the attainable utility values of the parties via the change of the decision 
fields. 
A rational decision subject will only consent to an agreement in a non-
dominated conflict situation if the degree of target achievement (utility value) 
after the agreement is not lower than without an agreement. To be able to compare 
different conflict solutions, the decision subject must develop concepts that 
illustrate how different forms of the conflict-resolution-relevant issues change the 
utility level after an agreement.  
Which kinds of conflict-resolution-relevant issues are still acceptable to 
a decision subject is determined by its decision value. It is possible that there exist 
many such combinations of conflict-resolution-relevant issues, in which case the 
decision value is determined by all critical combinations.  
The decision value always states the marginal agreement conditions of 
the considered decision subject in the underlying decision situation, i.e., it 
includes the extreme limit of concession willingness. The decision value as 
concession limit is handled as an extremely sensitive, confidential information in 
order not to weaken one's negotiation position. If an agreement based on the 
decision value of a party is reached, this party does not improve its outcome 
compared to the case of “non-agreement“. The decision subject is indifferent 
between “agreement at marginal conditions” and “non-agreement” because the 
utility value (success) of these two alternatives is the same.  
In conflict situations of the type acquisition/sale of a company, the 
possible price of a company plays a special and (usually also) dominant role, 
often leading to an exclusive focus on the determination of a price limit that is 
9
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rationally acceptable when determining the decision value. The only variable 
under dispute in this negotiation situation is the price. Because of this strong 
model simplification of the actual conflict situation, the decision value becomes a 
critical price for the respective negotiation party: the upper price limit (marginal 
price) from the presumptive buyer’s point of view and the lower price limit 
(marginal price) from the presumptive seller’s point of view. 
In other words: For the presumptive buyer, the decision value (his upper 
price limit) is exactly the price he can accept without an economic detriment after 
the acquisition (Matschke, 1969, p 59). For the presumptive seller, it is the lowest 
price limit he must achieve without suffering an economic detriment from the 
sale. An area of agreement exists with regard to the price P if the upper price limit 
Pmax of the presumptive buyer is no lower than the lowest price limit Pmin of the 
presumptive seller, in other words if Pmax ≥ Pmin applies. A transaction is 
advantageous for both parties if the condition Pmax > P > Pmin holds. 
The multi-dimensional disconnected conflict situation of the type 
acquisition/sale shown in figure 1 should describe the reality far better than the 
one-dimensional conflict situation addressed above.  
co
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combinations of non-price facts
K1 K2 K3 K6K5K1 K9K8K7
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the buyer Pmax
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Figure 1 Multi-dimensional conflict situation of the type acquisition/sale 
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To present this situation graphically, all non-price conflict-resolution-
relevant issues regarding different combinations were nominally combined on the 
abscissa. The price limits of the conflicting parties shall be interpreted as 
conditional variables. Depending on the non-price components, the buyer might 
offer more or less and the seller would have to demand more or less.  
There are two potential agreement areas in the example, namely the 
combinations of the non-price facts K3, K4 and K5 on the one hand and of K7 and 
K8 on the other hand because the upper price limit of the buyer is higher in these 
cases than the lowest price limit of the seller. Such a multi-dimensional situation 
requires creativity from both sides to discover the potential areas of agreement. 
2. MARGINAL PRICE AS A SPECIAL DECISION VALUE 
A) MODEL BASICS 
The decision value is calculated in two steps, regardless of the underlying conflict 
situation. 
The first step comprises the determination of the achievable level of 
utility for the conflicting party without agreement. This step is called determina-
tion of the base program.  
The second step comprises the establishment of the conflict-resolution-
relevant issues that a conflicting party rejects, prefers or judges indifferently 
because a lower, higher or equal level of utility is achievable from the conflicting 
party‘s perspective in case of an agreement.  
Of special interest for a negotiation is the set of conflict-resolution-
relevant issues that results in the same level of utility after an agreement as 
without an agreement or that results in the lowest possible increase of the level of 
utility compared to a non-agreement in case of discontinuities. During the nego-
tiation, they form the limit of concession willingness, the decision value. The 
second step is called determination of the valuation program. 
Based on this idea, it is possible to develop a general model to determine 
the decision value from which all other decision value determination methods can 
be derived. This general model (Matschke, 1975, p 387; Matschke/Brösel, 2007, 
p 142) does not require the determination of the targets and decision fields of the 
conflicting parties nor the number and type of conflict-resolution-relevant issues. 
Its applications are by no means limited to business valuation problems: it is 
applicable to any number of decision-dependent and interpersonal conflict 
situations without compulsory character. Because of its general applicability, it is 
of course extremely complex and very abstract.  
Instead, a less complex model shall be presented here, which has the 
advantage of offering an efficient algorithm to determine the decision value. 
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B) STATE MARGINAL PRICE MODEL – A GENERAL MODEL 
The so-called state marginal price model (in German: Zustands-Grenzpreismodell, 
ZGPM) was developed by Hering (2006).8 This investment model is a theoretical 
general model based on a one-dimensional, disconnected and non-dominant 
conflict situation of the type acquisition/sale (Hering/Olbrich/Steinrücke, 2006, 
p 409; Matschke/Brösel, 2007, p 201). 
The decision subject pursues a financial target, for example by maxi-
mizing time-structured withdrawals, and acts in an imperfect and incomplete 
capital market. His planning horizon is finite and extends over T periods, and in 
each period, investment and financial flows may take place. This model can be 
adapted to multivalued expectations. For the sake of simplicity, it shall be 
presented here only under the premise of certainty and only from the purchaser's 
point of view.  
With the state marginal price model, the marginal price of companies can 
be calculated in two steps based on multi-period, simultaneous planning 
approaches (Weingartner, 1963; Hax, 1964), using linear optimization methods. 
In the first step, the investment and financing program is calculated as 
the base program. This investment and financing program maximizes the target 
function under the assumption that the ownership rights are not changed. To 
determine this base program, an adequate linear optimization approach must be 
formulated and solved.  
The calculation of the base program helps the valuation subject 
determine the maximum utility level he can achieve without resolution of the 
conflict situation, i.e., the valuation object is not contained in the base program of 
the presumptive buyer. The conditions under which maximization is carried out 
include the loan possibilities, unlimited cash management and available interest-
carrying deposits in all periods. Predisposed payments – e.g., from current 
business activity and existing loan obligations – must be taken into account with a 
fixed payment balance, which is independent of the objects to be valued, and may 
be positive, negative, or zero. At any time, the returns from investment and 
financial objects and the balance of already predisposed payments should be 
sufficient to allow the distribution to the owner(s) at any time. In other words, the 
financial balance in the sense of liquidity must exist at all times by maintaining 
liquidity as condition.  
It is then possible to establish the following mathematical approach for 
the base program from a buyer's point of view: 
                                                      
8 Hering (2006) refers to the general models for marginal price determination of Laux/Franke 
(1969) as well as of Jaensch (1966) and Matschke (1972, p 153; 1975, p 253). 
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Target function: 
ENK
Ba ! max!
The size of the withdrawal flow expected by the buyer from the base 
program ENK
Ba  is maximized under the following restrictions: 
Restrictions: 
(1) Liquidity constraint (ability to pay at all times): The sum of excess deposits 
(income) to be realized from investment and financing objects and from 
current payments may not be smaller than the withdrawals: 
•  at t = 0: 
! gKj0 " xKj
j=1
J
#
deposit  surplus
to be realised from
investment and
financing objects
! "# $#
+ w K0 "ENK
Ba
desired
withdrawal
! "# $#
$ bK0
decision!
independent
payments
% .
Already at t = 0, an amount of w K 0! ENK
Ba may be withdrawn. bK0 can be 
interpreted as initially available own investment capital. 
• at t = 1, 2, …, T: 
! gKjt " xKj
j=1
J
#
deposit  surplus
to be realised from
investment and
financing objects
! "# $#
+ w Kt "ENK
Ba
desired
withdrawal
! "# $#
$ bKt
decision!
independent
payments
% .
The structure of the desired withdrawals in the future is 
w K1 : w K2 :  … : w KT!1 : w KT. If e.g., w KT = a +1 / i holds, w KT ! ENK
Ba may 
be interpreted as withdrawal amount a ! ENK
Ba as well as capital amount of 
which a continuous equal, permanent withdrawal flow of size ENK
Ba can be 
obtained if it is reinvested with interest. The payments bKt may be 
interpreted as equity capital increases planned for the future, but also as 
autonomous future payment obligations, allowing also bKt = 0.
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(2) Capacity limits (restrictions on the quantity of the investment and financing 
objects):  
The size xKj of the investment and financing objects to be realized may not 
violate the respective upper capacity limit (for j =1, 2, …. J): 
xKj ! xKj
max .
If capital investment or loan is available without limit, this restriction does 
not apply. 
(3) Non-negativity conditions: 
The choice variables and the withdrawal flow shall not become negative: 
xKj ! 0
ENK ! 0.
The results of this approach are the investments and financings sought to 
be realized, which together form the base program of the purchaser. The buyer 
expects a withdrawal stream with a maximum size of ENK
Ba  max from the base 
program. The withdrawals to be expected at the different points in time t thus are 
w Kt ! ENK
Ba  max .
During the second step for the here exclusively considered acquisition 
situation, the valuation object is included in the investment and financing program 
of the presumptive buyer. The result of this second step is the valuation program, 
which must include the valuation object in the acquisition situation. To guarantee 
rational action by the purchaser, the maximum payable purchase price is 
determined as the decision value on the condition that at least the target function 
contribution of the base program must be achieved again.  
The following approach leads to the determination of the valuation 
program and the decision value as the upper price limit of the buyer if the future 
payments from the company are summarized in the payment vector 
gUK = (0;gUK1;gUK2;  … ;gUKT ) :
9 
                                                      
9 In t = 0, the still to be negotiated price P must be considered as well. 
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Target function: 
P! max!
The price the buyer might pay (of course does not want to pay) is also 
maximized under restrictions. 
Restrictions: 
(1) Liquidity constraint (ability to pay at all times):  
The sum of the excess deposits to be realized from investment and financial 
objects and from decision-independent payments as well as from the 
company to be evaluated may not be smaller than the withdrawals: 
•  at t = 0, taking into account the still unknown price P: 
! gKj0 " xKj
j=1
J
# + P + w K0 "ENKBe $ bK0.
• 
at t = 1, 2, …, T, taking into account the company payments 
gUKt :
! gKjt " xKj
j=1
J
# + w Kt "ENKBe $ bKt + gUKt .
(2) Compliance with withdrawal stream ENK
Ba  max of the base program: 
The withdrawal possibilities of the base program shall also be reached again 
by means of the valuation program, in other words in case of an acquisition 
of the company at the marginal price: 
ENK
Be ! ENK
Ba  max .
(3) Capacity limits (restrictions of quantity of the investment and financing 
objects):  
The size of the investment and financing objects to be realized may not 
violate the respective upper capacity limit (for j =1, 2, …. J): 
xKj ! xKj
max .
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If the capital investment or loan opportunity is unlimited, this restriction does 
not apply. 
(4) Non-negativity conditions: 
The choice variables should not be negative; in addition, the case of the 
buyer being subsidized by the seller (negative purchase price) is excluded:10 
xKj ! 0
P ! 0.
The procedure for determining the decision value using the state 
marginal price model from the view of a presumptive buyer is now illustrated 
with an example with a multi-period planning span (T = 4), assuming (quasi-) 
certain expectations.  
The valuation subject already owns a small enterprise KU at the 
valuation date t = 0, which shall also constitute the decision and acquisition date. 
The valuation subject manages KU as general manager and receives a permanent 
deposit surplus from internal financing (IF) in the amount of 30. At t = 0, the 
valuation subject has the opportunity to make an investment AK. The payment 
sequence for this investment includes the price payable for it (–100, +30, +40, 
+50, +55). At t = 0, the valuation subject owns personal assets (EM) from family 
sources in the amount of 10. It is assumed that the main bank of the general 
manager in t = 0 makes a total loan ED in the amount of 50 available at an annual 
interest rate of 8% for investments of the valuation subject with a total term of 
four periods (years). Additional financial funds are available as operating loans in 
unlimited amounts at a short-term interest rate of 10% (KAt). Financial invest-
ments (GAt) of any amount may be made at the general manager’s main bank at 
an interest rate of 5% p. a. 
The valuation subject aims to achieve a uniform income stream (income 
maximization) to safeguard its existence. At T = 4, we obtain: 
w KT !ENK
Ba = ENK
Ba +
ENK
Ba
i
" w KT = 1+
1
i
= 1+
1
0.05
= 21,
so that the desired time structure reads:  
w K0 : w K1 : w K2 : w K3 : w K4 = 1:1:1:1: 21.
                                                      
10 The withdrawal stream of the base program is not negative. This also applies to the withdrawal 
stream of the valuation program so that an extra condition is not necessary. 
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This means that in addition to the regular distribution ENK
Ba , the last distribution 
shall contain the cash value or present value of a perpetual annuity based on an 
interest rate of 5% to guarantee the income ENK
Ba outside the planning period 
because the estimated interest rate of i = 5% p. a. is taken into account for t > 4 in 
the example.  
At t = 0 the valuation subject may acquire another enterprise U. For this 
enterprise, the payment stream gUK = (0, 60, 40, 20, 20) was estimated for the 
planning period. In addition, a permanent annuity in the amount of 20 is expected, 
starting in t = 5. The valuation subject seeks to determine the maximum payable 
price Pmax for enterprise U.  
In the table below, the data of the example are summarized. In order not 
to cut the vertical interdependencies between the selected planning period and the 
periods beyond the planning horizon, the perpetual payment surplus from internal 
financing and the perpetual annuity expected from the enterprise U starting from 
time t = 5 were also considered at time t = 4 through the factor 21 (thus including 
the respective payment due at time t = 4). The payments to be expected after time 
t > T = 4 are therefore taken into account in the example, using the estimated 
interest rate i = 5% p. a. (see figure 2).  
T AK ED GA0 GA1 GA2 GA3 KA0 KA1 KA2 KA3 EM IF U 
0 -100 50 -1 1 10 30 P? 
1 30 -4 1.05 -1 -1.1 1 30 60 
2 40 -4 1.05 -1 -1.1 1 30 40 
3 50 -4 1.05 -1 -1.1 1 30 20 
4 55 -54 1.05 -1.1 630 420 
Limit 1 1 8
 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 1 1 
Figure 2 Data of the example from the buyer´s point of view 
To determine the base program, the given data must be used to formulate 
a linear optimization approach that can be solved using the simplex algorithm: 
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ENK
Ba ! max!
100 "AK # 50 "ED +1"GA0 #1"KA0 +1"ENK
Ba $ 40
#30 "AK + 4 "ED #1.05 "GA0 +1"GA1 +1.1"KA0 #1"KA1 +1"ENK
Ba $ 30
#40 "AK + 4 "ED #1.05 "GA1 +1"GA2 +1.1"KA1 #1"KA2 +1"ENK
Ba $ 30
#50 "AK + 4 "ED #1.05 "GA2 +1"GA3 +1.1"KA2 #1"KA3 +1"ENK
Ba $ 30
#55 "AK + 54 "ED #1.05 "GA3 +1.1"KA3 + 21"ENK
Ba $ 630
AK, ED, GA0, GA1, GA2, GA3, KA0, KA1, KA2, KA3, ENK
Ba % 0
AK, ED $  1.
The solution gives the base program whose complete finance schedule is 
presented in figure 3: 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 
Personal assets EM 10         
Internal financing IF 30 30 30 30 630 
Investment AK -100 30 40 50 55 
Loan ED 42.7680 -3.4214 -3.4214 -3.4214 -46.1894 
Revolving line KA 49.8496 30.8736       
Financial investments GA       -43.9610   
KA-, GA-paybacks   -54.8346 -33.9610   46.1591 
Withdrawal EN -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 
Payment balance 0 0 0 0 652.3520 
Debt level from KA 49.8496 30.8736       
Deposits from GA 43.9610   
Terminal assets EN/0.05         652.3520 
Figure 3 Complete finance schedule of the buyer´s base program 
A maximum uniform income stream of the size ENK
Ba  max = 32.6176 
originates from the base program. At an interest rate of 5% p. a., the assets at the 
end of the planning period in the amount of 652.3520 are the source of a perpetual 
annuity of the determined size of ENK
Ba  max . The investment AK should be 
realized. To this end, internal financing IF, personal assets EM and the loan ED of 
0.855360 which matures at t = 4 as well as the operating loans KA in t = 0 and 
t = 1 are used. One-period financial investments GA are made in t = 3. The 
liquidity constraint is met as the payment balance during the periods t = 1, 2, 3 is 
0 while a surplus of 652.3520 results after the deduction of the withdrawal in the 
amount of ENK
Ba  max  in t = 4. 
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If the company U is included in the valuation program, at least the size 
of the uniform income stream of the base program must be reached again. To 
determine the valuation program, the formulated linear approach must again be 
solved using the simplex algorithm. 
P ! max!
100 "AK # 50 "ED +1"GA0 #1"KA0 +1"ENK
Be + P $ 40
#30 "AK + 4 "ED #1.05 "GA0 +1"GA1 +1.1"KA0 #1"KA1 +1"ENK
Be $ 90
#40 "AK + 4 "ED #1.05 "GA1 +1"GA2 +1.1"KA1 #1"KA2 +1"ENK
Be $ 70
#50 "AK + 4 "ED #1.05 "GA2 +1"GA3 +1.1"KA2 #1"KA3 +1"ENK
Be $ 50
#55 "AK + 54 "ED #1.05 "GA3 +1.1"KA3 + 21"ENK
Be $ 1,050
ENK
Be % 32.6176
AK, ED, GA0, GA1, GA2, GA3, KA0, KA1, KA2, KA3, P % 0
AK, ED $  1.
The complete financing plan of the valuation program is shown below in 
figure 4. 
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 
Personal assets EM 10         
Internal financing IF 30 30 30 30 630 
Company U 60 40 20 420 
Investment AK -100 30 40 50 55 
Loan ED 50 -4 -4 -4 -54 
Revolving line KA 434.0726 394.0975 360.1248 332.7549   
Financial investments GA           
KA-paybacks -477.4799 -433.5073 -396.1373 -366.0304 
Withdrawal EN -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 
Payment balance 391.4550 0 0 0 652.3520 
Debt level from KA 434.0726 394.0975 360.1248 332.7549   
Deposits from GA 
Terminal assets EN/0.05         652.3520 
Figure 4 Complete finance schedule of the buyer´s valuation program 
 The marginal price  P maxfor the company U is 391.4550. In t = 0, the 
valuation subject invests in company U and, as already in the base program, in 
object AK. In addition to internal financing IF, personal assets EM, and the loan 
ED which matures at t = 4, operating loans KA are used in all planning periods.  
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The decision value as the maximum payable price from the buyer's 
viewpoint can be calculated in tabular form by subtracting the numbers of the 
valuation program from the base program. This is shown below based on the 
numerical example to demonstrate which changes must be made to attain the 
valuation program from the base program. The differences indicate what is called 
the “comparison object“ in company valuation theory (see figure 5). 
The payment stream of the comparison object at t  > 0 corresponds to the 
payment stream of the company under valuation so that there is profit equality 
between valuation and comparison object. It is the mirror-image of the company 
under valuation because the buyer must do without the payment stream of the 
comparison object if the valuation object is acquired. The funds of the comparison 
object released at t = 0 are the upper price limit for the company under valuation. 
If the payment streams of the valuation and comparison object are added, payment 
balances of 0 currency units result for t > 0 since the profitability is the same, 
whereas a payment balance in the amount of the decision value results in t = 0.  
The comparison object in the example are additional operating loans at t 
= 0, t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3 as well as not executed monetary investments at t = 2 
and t = 3. The future payments expected from the additional third party funds as 
well as from suppressed investments correspond to the surplus deposits of the 
company so that the payment balance of the comparison object resulting at time t 
= 0 reflects the amount of the maximum payable price. The buyer's decision value 
Pmax of 391.4550 results from this “price“ of the comparison object. Because the 
payment stream of the comparison object is fixed, its internal interest can be 
determined. In the example, the internal interest rate of the comparison object 
from the buyer's point of view is rK =  0.0983642.  
The decision-oriented interpretation of the term “comparison object“ has 
nothing to do with a “comparable“ company as the term is erroneously understood 
in the literature. Therefore, the issue when determining the decision value is not to 
find a company comparable to the company under valuation. Rather, all measures 
to redesign the base program into the valuation program are the comparison 
object to the company to be evaluated because they constitute the alternative to 
the acquisition of the company at the decision value.  
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t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 
Valuation program of the buyer  
Personal assets EM 10         
Internal financing IF 30 30 30 30 630 
Company U 60 40 20 420 
Investment AK -100 30 40 50 55 
Loan ED 50 -4 -4 -4 -54 
Revolving line KA 434.0726 394.0975 360.1248 332.7549   
Financial investments GA           
KA-paybacks -477.4799 -433.5073 -396.1373 -366.0304 
Withdrawal EN -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 
Payment balance 391.4550 0 0 0 652.3520 
./. Base program of the buyer  
Personal assets EM 10         
Internal financing IF 30 30 30 30 630 
Investment AK -100 30 40 50 55 
Loan ED 42.7680 -3.4214 -3.4214 -3.4214 -46.1894 
Revolving line KA 49.8496 30.8736       
Financial investments GA       -43.9610   
KA-, GA-paybacks -54.8346 -33.9610   46.1591 
Withdrawal EN -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 -32.6176 
Payment balance 0 0 0 0 652.3520 
= Comparison object (changes between both programs)  
∆ Personal assets EM 0 0 0 0 0 
∆ Internal financing IF 0 0 0 0 0 
∆ Investment AK 0 0 0 0 0 
∆ Loan ED 7.2320 -0.5786 -0.5786 -0.5786 -7.8106 
∆ Revolving line KA 384.2230 363.2239 360.1248 332.7549 0 
∆ Financial investments GA 0 0 0 43.9610 0 
∆ KA-paybacks 0 -422.6453 -399.5463 -396.1373 -412.1894 
∆ Withdrawal EN 0 0 0 0 0 
= Payment balance of 
changes (comparison object) 391.4550 -60 -40 -20 -420 
Company U 60 40 20 420 
Decision value Pmax 391.4550 0 0 0 0 
Figure 5 Determination of the buyer´s comparison object 
If the expected payments from the company under valuation are 
discounted at the internal interest rate of this “comparison object“, a future 
performance value ZEW (in German: Zukunftserfolgswert) equal to the maximum 
payable price, i.e., the decision value, results (see figure 6).  
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t 0 1 2 3 4 
Company U 60 40 20 420 
rK 0.098364 
(1 + rK)-t 1 0.910445 0.82891 0.754677 0.687091 
Cash value/Present value   54.6267 33.1564 15.0935 288.5784 
Future performance value ZEW 391.4550 
Figure 6 Determination of the decision value from the buyer´s point 
of view based on the internal interest rate of the comparison object 
Thus the decision value can be formally determined by discounting the 
future payments of the company to be acquired with the internal interest rate of 
the comparison object, i.e., as future performance value. However, this does not 
prove that this method is legitimate. This issue shall be discussed below.  
C) FUTURE PERFORMANCE VALUE 
METHOD – A PARTIAL MODEL 
The future performance value method is a partial model which only takes into 
account the valuation object and not the entity of all possible actions of the 
decision model. Compared to the total model “state marginal price model”, a 
company valuation loses a substantial amount of complexity if the partial model 
“future performance value method” (in German: Zukunftserfolgswertmethode) is 
used. 
Depending on the structure of the expected payments, the determination 
of the future performance value ZEW can be based on different valuation formu-
las of which the most important variations will be discussed below:  
1.  for a finite planning horizon of T periods with differing or constant future 
financial performances11 ZE (in German: Zukunftserfolg) and flat12 interest 
structure (same interest rate i during all periods 1 to T): 
ZEW =
ZEt
(1+ i)tt=1
T
!  or – when ZEt = ZE = const. – ZEW = ZE "
(1+ i)T #1
i " (1+1)T
.
                                                      
11 The term “future performance” means future surplus deposits expected by the decision subject 
from the business under valuation. “Future performance value” is the sum of the present values of 
the future performance. The present values are determined by discounting.  
12 In case of a “flat” interest structure the interest rate is constant, independent of the investment 
period t. 
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2. for a finite planning horizon of T periods with different future financial 
performances ZE and non-flat13 interest structure (differing interest rates 
during periods 1 to T): 
ZEW =
ZEt
(1+ i! )
!=1
t
"t=1
T
# .
3. for an infinite planning horizon with constant future financial performances 
ZE and flat interest structure: 
ZEW = lim
T!"
ZE #
(1+ i)T $1
i # (1+1)T
=
ZE
i
.
4. for an infinite planning horizon with different future financial performances 
during the first T periods and subsequent constant future financial 
performances and flat interest structure: 
ZEW =
ZEt
(1+ i)tt=1
T
! + ZET+1i "
1
(1+ i)T
.
5. for a finite planning horizon with different future financial performances 
during the first T periods and subsequent future financial performances 
increasing at rate w for n periods and flat interest structure (with w ! i):
ZEW =
ZEt
(1+ i)tt=1
T
! + ZET+1 "
1
(1+ i)T
"
1
i # w
" 1#
1+ w
1+ i
$
%&
'
()
n+1$
%
&
&
'
(
)
)
.
6. for an infinite planning horizon with different future financial performances 
during the first T periods and subsequent future financial performances 
increasing infinitely at rate w and flat interest structure (with w < i):
                                                      
13 In case of a “non-flat” interest structure the interest rate differs depending on period t: in case of 
a “normal” interest structure it is increasing in t, in case of an “inverse” interest structure it is 
decreasing in t. 
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ZEW =
ZEt
(1+ i)tt=1
T
! + ZET+1 "
1
(1+ i)T
"
1
i # w
.
These formulas only explain the actuarial basis of the future performance 
value method as a current value method, but do not explain whether the future 
performance value constitutes a decision value in the sense of a marginal price. 
The issue is: Why is this procedure legitimate? Can the current value 
calculation prove to be a sensible process to determine the decision value as the 
future performance value from the viewpoint of a buyer or seller in case of a 
purely actuarial target, as generally assumed without further inspection? How 
can the necessary calculation interest rates i for the decision value determination 
be found? Are the interests of the valuation subjects preserved if the future 
performance value method is applied and if yes, why? 
The use of this method to determine the decision value is only legitimate 
if the future performance value formula can be theoretically explained. Perhaps its 
applicability limits can be determined, so that the assumptions that have to be 
made in case of its application are indicated. Also, the following questions could 
then be answered: What results if these assumptions are not strictly fulfilled? Is 
the future performance value formula still helpful? 
The key to moving from the investment theoretical general model “state 
marginal price model” to the investment theoretical partial model “future 
performance value method” is the duality theory of linear optimization (Wein-
gartner, 1963; Hering, 1999; Hering, 2008, p 142) because: “Each linear 
optimization task (primal problem) is assigned a closely related dual problem that
allows conclusions regarding the valid contexts contained in the optimum 
solution” (Hering, 2006, p 50). The primal problem of determining the maximum 
payable price Pmax from the buyer's point of view is the already stated approach of 
the valuation program from the buyer's view, which is restated here in abbreviated 
form:  
P ! max!
(1) liquidity restrictions
(1a) " gKj0 # xKj
j=1
J
$ + P + w K0 #ENKBe % bK0 (for t = 0)
(1b) " gKjt # xKj
j=1
J
$ + w Kt #ENKBe % bKt + gUKt (for t = 1,  …,  T)
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(2) securing of the withdrawal stream
ENK
Be & ENK
Ba  max
(3) capacity restrictions
xKj % xKj
max (for j = 1, …, J)
(4) non-negativity constraints
(4a) xKj & 0 (for j = 1, …, J)
(4b) ENK
Be & 0
(4c) P & 0.
The variables to be determined in the primal problem are the size of 
investment and financing objects xKj , the size of the withdrawal stream ENK
Be
from the valuation program as well as the potential price P of the valuation object. 
To maximize P in case of assumed divisibility of the investments and financings 
to be realized, the optimum solution must satisfy the withdrawal restriction (2) 
with equality, i.e., the withdrawal stream of the valuation program equals the 
maximum withdrawal stream of the base program: ENK
Be = ENK
Ba  max .
The respective dual problem is then (Gale/Kuhn/Tucker, 1951): 
K := bKt !dt
t=0
T
"
evaluated  autonomous
payments
! "# $#
+ gUKt !dt
t=1
T
"
evaluated  company
payments
! "# $#
liquidity restrictions% &#### '####
# $ !ENK
Ba  max
evaluated  autonomous
payments
! "# $#
withdrawal restrictions% &## '##
+ xKj
max !u j
j=1
J
"
evaluated  autonomous
payments
! "# $#
capacity restrictions% &## '##
% min!
(1) restriction on the payments (investments and financing)
# gKjt !dt
t=0
T
" + u j & 0 (for j = 1, …, J)
(2) restriction on the weighting factors of the withdrawal stream
w Kt !dt
t=0
T
" # $ & 0
(3) restrictions on the dual variables of the liquidity restrictions
(3a) d0 & 1 (for t = 0)
(3b) dt & 0 (for t = 1, …, T)
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(4a) restrictions on the dual variables of the capacity restrictions
u j & 0 (for j = 1, …, J)
(4b) restrictions on the dual variables for the securing of the withdrawal stream
$ & 0.
The autonomous payments bKt correspond to the right -hand sides of the 
payment restrictions of the valuation program without the payments from the 
company under valuation, i.e., the right-hand sides of the payment restrictions of 
the base program. The evaluated right-hand sides of the restrictions of the primal 
problem are in the target function of the dual program. The variables of the dual 
problem to be determined are the dual variables dt (for the liquidity constraint in 
t = 0, …, T), uj (for the capacity restrictions with j = 1, …, J) and δ (for the 
restriction of securing the withdrawal stream). The dual variables shall be 
established in the optimum of the dual problem so that the sum of the evaluated 
right-hand sides of the restrictions, i.e., the opportunity costs K of these 
restrictions, becomes as small as possible. The optimum solution of the dual 
problem is then Kmin. 
From the conditions ENK
Be = ENK
Ba  max and ENK
Be ≥ 0 in the primal 
problem and from ENK
Ba max > 0 as the optimal solution of the base program, it 
follows that the withdrawal restriction (2) at the optimum of the dual problem 
must equal the following: 
w Kt !dt
t=0
T
" # $ % 0
and
$ = w Kt !dt
t=0
T
" .
It holds that the maximum of the primal problem (with solution: Pmax) 
equals the minimum of the dual problem (with solution: Kmin). Because of this 
relationship, the definition equation of K may be used to calculate Pmax. If the 
solution for δ is considered, the following equation for the decision value Pmax 
results: 
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Pmax = bKt !dt
t=0
T
" + gUKt !dt
t=1
T
" + xKjmax !u j
j=1
J
" # ENKBa  max ! w Kt !dt
t=0
T
" .
In the optimal solution of the primal problem, P = Pmax > 0 holds, thus 
the liquidity constraint (1a) of the primal problem is slack. It follows from the 
theorem of complementary slackness that the restriction (3a) must be binding so 
that d0 = 1 holds. The dual variable d0 = 1 means that today's payments are 
included in the calculation of Pmax without modification. For the other dual values 
dt for t = 1, …, T the relation dt / d0 =:!Kt
Be holds. !Kt
Be are to be interpreted as 
discount factors for the valuation program, which may be derived from the 
endogenous period marginal interest rates iKt
Be of the valuation program of the 
buyer (Rollberg, 2001, p 178; Hering, 2008, p 182): 
!Kt
Be =
1
(1+ iK"
Be )
"=1
t
#
.
This means: 1 currency unit of the time period t > 0 is then worth !Kt
Be
currency units at t = 0 so that future payments are included in the calculation of 
Pmax with their cash value, or in other words are converted. 
For investment and financing objects j contained in the valuation 
program, restriction (1) of the dual problem is satisfied at its lower limit: 
! gKjt "dt
t=0
T
# + u j = 0 $ u j = gKjt "dt
t=0
T
#
and a non-negative capital value (as net-present value) CKj
Be ! 0 at t = 0 results. 
Since CKj
Be constitutes a current monetary value, it follows from the theory of 
marginal cost pricing that CKj
Be !d0 = u j holds and consequently, u j and CKj
Be  are 
identical because d0 = 1. 
In case of disadvantageous investment and financing objects, the 
restriction (1) of the dual problem is slack. It follows that the restriction (4a) of 
the dual problem must be binding, hence the dual variable u j is 0 for disadvan-
tageous investment and financing objects with negative capital value. 
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Considering this, Pmax may be written as follows: 
Pmax = bKt !dt
t=0
T
" + gUKt !dt
t=1
T
" + xKjmax !u j
j=1
J
" # ENKBa  max ! w Kt !dt
t=0
T
"
or because of 
dt
d0
=:$Kt
Be  and d0 = 1 and CKj
Be = gKjt ! $Kt
Be
t=1
T
"
Pmax = bKt ! $Kt
Be
t=0
T
" + gUKt ! $KtBe
t=1
T
" + xKjmax !CKjBe
j=1
J
" # ENKBa  max ! w Kt ! $KtBe
t=0
T
" .
An adjustment leads to the following expression for the decision value 
Pmax, the so-called “complex“ formula of valuation (Laux/Franke, 1969, p 214; 
Hering, 2006, p 52):14 
Pmax = gUKt ! "Kt
Be
t=1
T
#
future  performance value
of the company to be
evaluated
! "# $#
+ bKt ! "Kt
Be
t=0
T
# + + xKjmax !CKjBe
j=1
J
#
capital value of the
remaining valuation program
! "#### $####
capital value of the valuation program
(before considering a price for the 
busininess to be evaluated)% &######## '########
$ w Kt !ENK
Ba  max ! "Kt
Be
t=0
T
#
capital value of the
base program
! "### $###
.
                                                      
14 A further correction of the future performance value method may be necessary depending on the 
level of complexity. For instance, the determination of the optimal production plan could be 
included. Brösel (2002, p 157) therefore deduces the “complex” formula of valuation which is 
essential if non-financial restrictions are to be considered. Here and in the following, we abstract 
from non-financial restrictions. 
The formula says that the maximum payable price Pmax can be calculated 
as the difference between the capital value of the valuation program (before 
considering a price for the business under valuation) and the capital value of the 
base program, which must be given up if the business shall be acquired. The 
tabulated procedure of calculating the difference between the valuation program 
and the base program (see figure 5) is reflected in this equation. 
The future performance value of the business under valuation is part of 
the capital value of the valuation program (before considering a price for the 
business under valuation) and in principle does not equal the decision value Pmax
from the buyer's point of view. The valuation program is the buyer’s best program 
when the negotiated price P equals the decision value Pmax.  
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Rearrangements lead to the following formula for the decision value Pmax
from the buyer's point of view: 
Pmax = gUKt
payments  of
the valuation
object!
! "Kt
Be
discount
factor!
t=1
T
#
future  performance value
of the company to be
evaluated
" #$$ %$$
+ bKt ! "Kt
Be
t=0
T
# + xKjmax !CKjBe
CKj >0
#
sum  of the
positive capital
values& '$$ ($$
capital value of the valuation program
(without the valuation object)
" #$$$$ %$$$$
$ w Kt !ENK
Ba  max ! "Kt
Be
t=0
T
#
capital value of the
base program
" #$$$ %$$$
change of the capital value as a result of transforming the base program
to the valuation program %  0
" #$$$$$$$$$ %$$$$$$$$$
.
According to this, the maximum payable price Pmax as the buyer’s 
decision value results from the future performance value of the business ZEW, 
taking into account the capital value difference by transforming the base program 
into the valuation program of the buyer : 
Pmax = ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) + "KWK
Be#Ba  with "KWK
Be#Ba $ 0,  so that
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) = Pmax # "KWK
Be#Ba
or
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) % Pmax .
The future performance value based on endogenous marginal interest 
rates of the valuation program thus constitutes a lower limit for the buyer’s 
decision value. 
The question is now whether it is also possible to determine an upper limit 
for the buyer's decision value. This is indeed possible. The starting point is the dual 
problem for the determination of the buyer's base program (Hering, 2006, p 55). It 
can be shown that the capital value difference !KWK
Be"Ba is actually not negative, 
as assumed in the calculation equation. The upper limit for the buyer's decision 
value corresponds to the future performance value ZEWU
K (!Kt
Ba )  calculated with the 
discount factors resulting from the base program. The future performance value can 
be calculated using the so-called formula of “simplified”15 valuation (using the 
endogenous marginal interest rates of the base program):16 
                                                      
15 This means that the calculation is only based on the payments of the company under valuation 
without consideration of the transformation from the base program into the valuation program. 
16 That the future performance value on the basis of the endogenous marginal interest rates of the 
base program has to be the upper limit for the decision value Pmax of the buyer follows from a 
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be calculated using the so-called formula of “simplified”15 valuation (using the 
endogenous marginal interest rates of the base program):16 
Pmax ! gUkt "
1
(1+ iK#
Ba )
#=1
t
$
discount  factor! "# $#
t=1
T
%
future  performance value
of the valuation object
based on the endogenous
interest rates of the 
base  program
% &### '###
= ZEWU
K (&Kt
Ba )
under the constraint 
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Ba ) " Pmax .
The buyer's decision value Pmax must consequently lie between the 
following limits (Hering, 2006, p 57):17 
                                                      
plausible consideration: If Pmax exceeded the future performance value, paying Pmax would be unprofitable because the capital value would be negative. 
17 Concerning this interval, see Brösel (2002, p 166), in case that non-financial restrictions have to 
be considered. 
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) " Pmax " ZEWU
K (!Kt
Ba )
or
gUkt #
1
(1+ iK$
Be )
$=1
t
%
discount  factor! "# $#
t=1
T
&
future  performance value
of the valuation object
based on the endogenous
interest rates of the 
valuation program
% &### '###
" Pmax " gUkt #
1
(1+ iK$
Ba )
$=1
t
%
discount  factor! "# $#
t=1
T
&
future  performance value
of the valuation object
based on the endogenous
interest rates of the 
base  program
% &### '###
.
The lower limit is the future performance value based on the endogenous 
marginal interest rates of the valuation program, the upper limit is the future 
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interest rates differ between the base and valuation program, the valuation 
problem can only be solved using a general model (Laux/Franke, 1969, p 206; 
Moxter, 1983, p 143). Based on the partial model, at least the limits for the 
decision value can be derived.  
In an imperfect and incomplete capital market and without knowledge of 
the solution of the total model, the future performance value procedure is a 
procedure that narrows down the area in which the buyer's decision value Pmax
will lie. For this purpose, it is necessary to estimate endogenous marginal interest 
rates of the base program and the valuation program as precisely as possible. Even 
in case of certainty, there is vagueness in the application of the future 
performance value method as a partial model regarding the determination of the 
relevant decision value. This vagueness results from the imperfection of the 
capital market and the resulting differences between the endogenous marginal 
interest rates of base and valuation program.18 
In the numerical example of the decision value determination from the 
buyer's point of view, the state marginal price model was used to compute a 
                                                      
18 If the endogenous marginal interest rates of both programs are equal, transformations between 
the base program and the valuation program are realized with a capital value of zero i.e. 
!KWK
Be"Ba = 0.  Only marginal objects are replaced or additionally included. In such a situation, 
the “simplified“ valuation formula of the future performance value can be used as a method to 
calculate the exact decision value as maximum payable price from the buyer's point of view. The 
“simplified” valuation formula of the future performance value method to calculate the buyer's 
decision value is always applicable in case of a perfect capital market because marginal 
transactions are always carried out at the current market interest rate i. Based on this, the following 
holds if we also assume that the interest rate is constant through time: !Kt
Be = !Kt
Ba = (1+ i)"1.
maximum payable price of 391.455 currency units. From the dual problem of the 
base program (see figure 4), it follows that the endogenous marginal interest rates 
are 10% in the first and second period, 6.39% in the third and 5% in the fourth 
period.19 
19 As a result of the resolution of the dual problem of the base program, the following (rounded) 
dual prices are calculated for the liquidity restriction: d0 = 0.05249704, d1 = 0.04772458, d2 = 0.04338599, d3 = 0.0407805, d4 = 0.03883866. The respective discount factors of the period t are 
!t = dt/d0. The endogenous marginal interest rates it of the period t are derived from the relation 
it = !t"1 / !t "1.
performance value based on the endogenous marginal interest rates of the base 
program (computed with the formula of “simplified” valuation). If the marginal 
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Time t 0 1 2 3 4 
Company U 60 40 20 420 
Endogenous marginal interest rates of the base program 
iKt
Ba
0.1 0.1 0.0639 0.05 
Discounting factor !Kt
Ba
0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7768082 0.7398174 
Present value/Cash value   54.5455 33.0579 15.5362 310.7233 
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) 413.8628         
Endogenous marginal interest rates of the valuation program 
iKt
Be
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Discounting factor !Kt
Be
0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7513148 0.6830135 
Present value/Cash value   54.5455 33.0579 15.0263 286.8657 
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) 389.4953         
Figure 7 Upper and lower limit of the decision value Pmax 
Figure 8  contains the synopsis of the data for the “complex” calculation 
formula. Because of the assumed knowledge of the endogenous marginal interest 
rates, it directly provides the buyer’s exact decision value Pmax.20 
                                                      
20 To make clear that the borrowing of operating loans KA are the marginal transactions, their 
summarized payments are listed and their capital value is calculated. 
In the valuation program, the marginal transactions (see figure 5) are
exclusively the borrowing of operating funds KA at 10%. 
In figure 7, the data of the example are consolidated and the upper limit 
and lower limit of the maximum payable amount from the buyer's point of view 
are calculated. As expected, ZEWU
K ( !Kt
Be ) " Pmax " ZEWU
K ( !Kt
Ba ) holds or in 
numerical values: 389.4953 < Pmax = 391.4550 < 413.8628.  
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Time 0 1 2 3 4 
Right-hand side of the payment restrictions of the valuation program 
(without payments of the company to be evaluated) 
Right-hand side bKt 40 30 30 30 630 
Discounting factors !Kt
Be
1 0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7513148 0.6830135 
Present value bKt ! "Kt
Be
40 27.2727 24.7934 22.5394 430.2985 
Present value sum bKt ! "Kt
Be# 544.9040 
Capital value 
Investment AK -100 30 40 50 55 
Discounting factors !Kt
Be
1 0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7513148 0.6830135 
Present value investment AK -100 27.2727 33.0579 37.5657 37.5657 
Capital value investment AK 35.4621 
Total loan ED 50 -4 -4 -4 -54 
Discounting factors !Kt
Be
1 0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7513148 0.6830135 
Present value total loan ED 50 -3.6364 -3.3058 -3.0053 -36.8827 
Capital value total loan ED 3.1699 
Operating loan KA 434.1446 -83.3867 -73.3867 -63.3867 -366.1202 
Discounting factors !Kt
Be
1 0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7513148 0.6830135 
Present value operating loan 434.1446 -75.8061 -60.6502 -47.6234 -250.0650 
Capital value operating loan 0 
Withdrawals w Kt ! ENK
Ba  max
32.6176 32.6176 32.6176 32.6176 684.9696 
Discounting factors !Kt
Be
1 0.9090909 0.8264463 0.7513148 0.6830135 
Present value withdrawals 32.6176 29.6524 26.9567 24.5061 467.8435 
Capital value base program 581.5762 
ZEWU
K (!Kt
Be ) 389.4953 
+ Present value sum  
bKt ! "Kt
Be# 544.9040 
+ Capital value AK 35.4621 583.5360 
+ Capital value ED 3.1699 
Cash value sum of 
+  the remaining 
valuation program 
–  Capital value base program -581.5762 
Sum = Pmax 391.4550 
Figure 8 Components of the “complex” calculation formula for the buyer 
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DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN FUNCTIONAL AND 
MARKET VALUE-ORIENTED BUSINESS VALUATION 
The main differences between functional and market value-oriented business 
valuation shall now be discussed on the basis of the prior explanations. 
Functional business valuation is strongly individualistic in its main 
functions, i.e., it is directed toward the concrete goals, plans, expectations and 
action possibilities of the valuation subjects in imperfect and incomplete markets. 
It is also conflict-oriented, i.e., directed at a possible interpersonal conflict in 
connection with ownership changes between only a few decision subjects and 
with several conflict-relevant issues. Functional business valuation considers real 
existing conditions that are illustrated in a model-theoretically simplified way, but 
may be examined intersubjectively. 
In contrast, the today widespread so-called market value oriented 
valuation establishes an idealized model world based on the neo-classical finance 
theory.21 It is geared towards the anonymous, exchange-organized ideal and 
complete capital market and towards the capital providers acting in it, i.e., it is 
superindividually oriented. The starting point of this approach is not a specific 
task because the purpose-dependency of the value is not recognized. In addition, it 
has another serious deficiency: In contrast to the older objective theory, this 
younger objective valuation concept denies the difference between value and 
price and is thus incredibly unrealistic.  
Regarding the market assumed by the representatives of the market-
oriented valuation, it is assumed that homogeneous (equal) goods are traded at the 
same time (i.e., on the same market) at the same price. The degree of knowledge 
of all market participants is the same: the conclusions from the available 
information coincide. The individual market participant has no market power in 
this market. The price is given. Value and price must coincide under these ideal 
market conditions by assumption.22 
The so-called market-value oriented valuation has thus completely 
ignored and forgotten the simplest references to the conditions of real capital 
markets. 
                                                      
21 For the neo-classical valuation theory and for the classical Anglo-American valuation theory, 
see e.g. Dean (1951), Hirshleifer (1958), Weingartner (1963). The neo-classical valuation theory 
rejects the classical theory. 
22 These assumptions are an ideal and complete market as well as perfect competition. An ideal 
market means all market participants are aware of the returns (payment flows) of all traded 
securities and the returns are equal for all market participants depending on their amount and their 
temporal structure. A complete market means all possible states can be reproduced by linearly 
combining traded securities (payment flows), so that any payment flows can be reproduced by 
traded securities. Perfect competition says that no market participant has market power and is able 
to influence the prices of the traded securities (Debreu, 1959; Arrow, 1964). 
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The representatives of the market-value-oriented valuation do not ask 
what the purpose of the valuation is, but concentrate on the valuation process by 
which one can allegedly determine the “market value“. But even an economics 
freshman knows that the market value (market price) is derived as an exchange 
value determined by supply and demand and that gains of trade arise precisely 
because the average buyer valuation is higher and the average seller valuation is 
lower than this market price.  
The market-value-oriented valuation was deliberately not discussed in 
this article. This concept that has covered business valuation theory like mildew 
should be sufficiently familiar, in particular since the so-called discounted cash 
flow method that allegedly determines the market value constitutes a consulting 
product offered worldwide. The “theoretical“ discussion of these methods 
revolves around the futile question of how different DCF methods can be made to 
lead to the same valuation result – a problem that already existed for the 
representatives of the older objective concept. At that time as well as today, 
different valuation results are considered annoying. They may undermine the 
belief in the validity of the presented “market value” and consequently the 
authority of the appraisers as secular “cast of priests” who know the secrets of the 
“market value”, which may thus negatively affect their financial interests.  
No single DCF method (WACC-approach, Entity-approach, Equity-
approach, APV-approach) has a decision-theoretical foundation (Hering/Olbrich/ 
Steinrücke, 2006, p 411). However, the DCF methods offer a fertile ground for 
argumentation values due to their numerous inherent possibilities of manipulation. 
From the viewpoint of the functional business valuation theory, these methods can 
be used to bolster arguments brought forward by a conflicting party during a 
negotiation under two conditions:  
1. the value so determined may not violate the decision value of the arguing 
person; 
2. the conflicting party using it as an argumentation aid must be convinced that 
it may impress the other negotiating party and lead to a result more favorable 
for the arguing party.  
Any conflicting party should however know the exact limits of the 
applicability of the used DCF methods and should never forget that these methods 
cannot determine the limit of the concession willingness, i.e., the decision value. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article gives an introduction to the concept of functional business valuation. 
Functional business valuation differs from other business valuation methods in 
that it recognizes that there does not exist just one value for an enterprise, but that 
there coexist different values of an enterprise depending on the person for whom 
the valuation is conducted and the purpose of the valuation. Functional business 
valuation also takes into account that the typical enterprise is not traded publicly, 
so that any valuation based on the assumption of perfect capital markets and 
perfect competition is out of place. Moreover, even if a company is publicly 
traded, the value for a whole business cannot be appropriately determined by just 
multiplying the market value of a single share with the total number of shares.  
After having introduced the reader to the basic ideas and terminology of 
functional business valuation, we use detailed numerical examples to explain how 
a one-dimensional decision value for an undominated purchase/sale situation can 
be determined. In the example, we first work with a more complex framework, 
the so-called “state marginal price model”, and then show under which conditions 
a simplified procedure, the so-called “future performance value method”, can be 
employed. We also compare the popular market-based valuation methods, such as 
the discounted cash flow method, and the functional business valuation method.  
REFERENCES 
Arrow, K.J. (1964) The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-
bearing. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 31, pp. 91–96. 
Brösel, G. (2002) Medienrechtsbewertung. Wiesbaden, DUV. 
Brösel, G. (2006) Eine Systematisierung der Nebenfunktionen der funktionalen 
Unternehmensbewertungstheorie. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und 
Praxis, Vol. 58, pp. 128–143. 
Dean, J. (1951) Capital Budgeting. New York, Columbia University Press. 
Debreu, G. (1959) Theory of Value. New Haven and London, Wiley. 
Gale, D., Kuhn, H.W., Tucker, A.W. (1951) Linear Programming and the 
Theory of Games. Koopmans, T.C. (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production 
and Allocation. New York, London, pp. 317–329. 
36
Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis, Vol. 5 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7
DOI: 10.2202/1932-9156.1097
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
Angemeldet | 10.248.254.158
Heruntergeladen am | 28.08.14 04:47
   
 
Goetzke, W., Sieben, G. (eds.) (1977) Moderne Unternehmungsbewertung und 
Grundsätze ihrer ordnungsmäßigen Durchführung. Köln, GEBERA. 
Gorny, C. (2002) Unternehmensbewertung in Verhandlungsprozessen. Wies-
baden, DUV. 
Gossen, H.H. (1854) Entwickelung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs, und 
der daraus fließenden Regeln für menschliches Handeln. Braunschweig, 
Prager. 
Hax, H. (1964) Investitions- und Finanzplanung mit Hilfe der linearen Pro-
grammierung. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche For-
schung. Vol. 16, pp. 430–446. 
Hering, T. (1999) Finanzwirtschaftliche Unternehmensbewertung. Wiesbaden, 
DUV. 
Hering, T. (2006) Unternehmensbewertung. 2nd edition, Munich and Vienna, 
Oldenbourg. 
Hering, T. (2008) Investitionstheorie. 3rd edition, Munich, Oldenbourg. 
Hering, T., Olbrich, M., Steinrücke, M. (2006) Valuation of start-up internet 
companies. International Journal of Technology Management, Vol. 33, 
pp. 406–419. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1958) On the Theory of Optimal Investment Decision. Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 66, pp. 329–352.
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (ed.) (2009) Deutschland in Zahlen 2009. 
Cologne, Deutscher Instituts-Verlag GmbH (DIV). 
Jaensch, G. (1966) Ein einfaches Modell der Unternehmungsbewertung ohne 
Kapitalisierungszinsfuß. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaft-
liche Forschung, Vol. 18, pp. 660–679. 
Jevons, W.S. (1871) The Theory of Political Economy, London and New York, 
Macmillan.
Klingelhöfer, H.E. (2006) Finanzwirtschaftliche Bewertung von Umweltschutz-
investitionen. Wiesbaden, DUV. 
37
Matschke et al.: Fundamentals of Functional Business Valuation
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
Angemeldet | 10.248.254.158
Heruntergeladen am | 28.08.14 04:47
   
Laux, H., Franke, G. (1969) Zum Problem der Bewertung von Unternehmungen 
und anderen Investitionsgütern. Unternehmensforschung, Vol. 13, pp. 205–
223. 
Mandl, G., Rabel, K. (1997) Unternehmensbewertung. Vienna and Frankfurt/ 
Main.
Matschke, M.J. (1969) Der Kompromiß als betriebswirtschaftliches Problem 
bei der Preisfestsetzung eines Gutachters im Rahmen der Unternehmungs-
bewertung. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche For-
schung, Vol. 21, pp. 57–77. 
Matschke, M.J. (1971) Der Arbitrium- oder Schiedsspruchwert der Unterneh-
mung – Zur Vermittlerfunktion eines unparteiischen Gutachters bei der Un-
ternehmungsbewertung. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 
Vol. 23, pp. 508–520. 
Matschke, M.J. (1972) Der Gesamtwert der Unternehmung als Entscheidungs-
wert. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 24, pp. 146– 161.
Matschke, M.J. (1975) Der Entscheidungswert der Unternehmung. Wiesbaden, 
Gabler. 
Matschke, M.J. (1976) Der Argumentationswert der Unternehmung – Unter-
nehmungsbewertung als Instrument der Beeinflussung in der Verhandlung. 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 28, pp. 517–524. 
Matschke, M.J. (1979) Funktionale Unternehmungsbewertung, Vol. II, Der Ar-
bitriumwert der Unternehmung. Wiesbaden, Gabler. 
Matschke, M.J. (1981) Unternehmungsbewertung in dominierten Konfliktsitua-
tionen am Beispiel der Bestimmung der angemessenen Barabfindung für den 
ausgeschlossenen oder ausscheidungsberechtigten Minderheits-Kapitalgesell-
schafter. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 33, pp. 115–
129. 
Matschke, M.J., Brösel, G. (2007) Unternehmensbewertung. 3rd edition, Wies-
baden, Gabler. 
Menger, C. (1871) Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre. Vienna, Braumüller. 
38
Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis, Vol. 5 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 7
DOI: 10.2202/1932-9156.1097
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
Angemeldet | 10.248.254.158
Heruntergeladen am | 28.08.14 04:47
Moxter, A. (1983) Grundsätze ordnungsmäßiger Unternehmensbewertung.  2nd
edition, Wiesbaden, Gabler. 
Münstermann, H. (1966) Wert und Bewertung der Unternehmung. Wiesbaden, 
Gabler. 
Olbrich, M. (1999) Unternehmungskultur und Unternehmungswert. Wiesbaden, 
DUV. 
Olbrich, M., Brösel, G., Haßlinger, M. (2009) The Valuation of Airport Slots.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 74, pp. 897–917. 
Rollberg, R. (2001) Integrierte Unternehmensplanung. Wiesbaden, DUV. 
Schmalenbach, E. (1937) Finanzierungen. 6th edition, Leipzig, Gloeckner. 
Schneider, D. (2001) Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Vol. 4: Geschichte und Metho-
den. Munich and Vienna, Oldenbourg.
Sieben, G. (1976) Der Entscheidungswert in der Funktionenlehre der Unterneh-
mensbewertung. Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, Vol. 28, 
pp. 491–504. 
Sieben, G., Löcherbach, G., Matschke, M.J. (1974) Bewertungstheorie. Grochla, 
E., Wittmann, W. (eds.), Handwörterbuch der Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 1, 4th
edition, Stuttgart, Schäffer-Poeschel, col. 839–851. 
Tillmann, A. (1998) Unternehmensbewertung und Grundstückskontaminatio-
nen. Wiesbaden, DUV. 
Walras, L. (1874) Éléments d’économie politique pure ou théorie de la richesse 
sociale. Lausanne et al., Corbaz. 
Weingartner, H.M. (1963) Mathematical Programming and the Analysis of Ca-
pital Budgeting Problems. Englewood Cliffs (New Jersey), Prentice Hall. 
39
Matschke et al.: Fundamentals of Functional Business Valuation
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Ilmenau
Angemeldet | 10.248.254.158
Heruntergeladen am | 28.08.14 04:47
